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Abstract
Article 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution States after the third amendment, “the 
judicial power shall be independent in administering justice so as to uphold the law 
and equality.” The Indonesian Constitutional Court is one of the performers of the 
independent judicial power who plays a significant role in the enforcement of the 
constitution and the principle of the state based on the law by its authority and 
obligations as determined by the 1945 Constitution. This paper intends to study 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court to find out whether the Constitutional Court 
in exercising its constitutional authority can be independent. Also, this article 
will examine not just institutional independence but also judges independence 
to understand current issues related to the role of ethics and conduct of judges. 
The independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court supported by the 1945 
Constitution after the amendments from 1999 until 2002, and further stipulated 
in Law. However, it can be said that this institution has ups and downs of public 
trust due to corruption cases conducted by constitutional justices. Also, in several 
political instances showed efforts of political institutions to limit the authority of 
the Constitutional Court. In its experiences, the Constitutional Court succeeded 
in convincing the parties through its decisions and strengthening institutional 
independence against the influence that tried to destabilize its institutions. 
The Council of Ethics of Constitutional Judges that maintains the values and 
behavior of judges also continuously works and efficient enough in overseeing 
the ethics and conduct of judges. The decision of the Ethics Council may also 
be accepted as a proportional decision.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background
Based on the provision of Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court of Indonesia has the authority to try cases at the first and 
final level, the decisions of which shall be final, to conduct judicial review of 
laws against the Constitution, to settle disputes on authorities between state 
institutions whose powers are bestowed by the Constitution, to decide upon 
the dissolution of political parties, and to decide upon electoral disputes. The 
Constitutional Court shall render a judgment on the opinion of the DPR alleging 
that the President and/or the Vice President have/has committed a violation of 
law in the form of treason against the state, corruption, bribery, other felonies, 
or disgraceful acts, and/or no longer meets the qualification as President and/or 
Vice-President as referred to in the Constitution of the State of the Republic of 
Indonesia of the Year 1945.The provision is restated in Article 10 Constitutional 
Court Law1 and Article 12 paragraph (1) of Law of the Republic of Indonesia 
Number 4 The year 2004 concerning Judicial Authority.
According to Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006, the presence of the Constitutional 
Court, as the state institution authorized by the 1945 Constitution to try and pass 
final decisions at the first and last level on state administration issues, is a logical 
consequence of the new state government system to be established by the 1945 
Constitution following a series of amendments. Such new state government system 
is a system which basic ideas are intended to make Indonesia into a democratic 
constitutional state (democratische rechtsstaat), namely a democratic state 
based on constitution (constitutional democracy), as reflected in the provisions 
of Article 1 paragraph (2) and paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, which 
constitute the elaboration of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, especially 
the fourth paragraph. Therefore, the entire provisions of the 1945 Constitution, 
as an integrated system, constitute the further elaboration of the basic ideas and 
accordingly, they can be explained based on such basic ideas.2
1 Constitutional Court Law is the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 of the year 2003 regarding the Constitutional Court 
as amended by the Law Number 8 of the Year 2011 regarding the Amendment to the Law Number 24 of the year 2003 regarding 
the Constitutional Court.
2  Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, August 23, 2006.
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Whereas the first requirement for every country applying the principles 
of rule of law and constitutional democracy is constitutionalism principle, 
namely the principle placing the constitution as the highest law, the 
substance of which is contained in the Fourth Paragraph of the Preamble 
of the 1945 Constitution, as the realization of the statement of the country’s 
independence, which is reflected among others in the sentence, “…. Indonesia’s 
national independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the State of 
Indonesia”. Accordingly, the constitution is the fundamental statement of what 
a group of people gathered together as citizens of a particular nation view as 
the basic rules and values which they share and to which they agree to bind 
themselves (please refer to Barry M. Hager, Rule of Law, A Lexicon for Policy 
Makers, 2000). Based on this reason, for countries applying the principles of 
rule of law and constitutional democracy, “constitutions should serve as the 
highest form of law to which all other laws and governmental actions must 
conform. As such, constitutions should embody the fundamental precepts of a 
democratic society rather than serving to incorporate ever-changing laws more 
appropriately dealt with by statute. Similarly, governmental structures and 
actions should seriously conform with constitutional norms, and constitutions 
should not mere ceremonial or aspirational documents” (please refer to John 
Norton More, 1990).3 
Therefore, according to Constitutional Court on Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006, 
there must be a mechanism ensuring that the provisions of the Constitution 
are implemented in the daily life of the state. To ensure the enforcement and 
implementation of the constitution, the presence of the Constitutional Court 
is a sure thing, namely as an institution functioning as the guardian of the 
constitution, and because of such function, the Constitutional Court is the sole 
judicial interpreter of the constitution. Based on such thought, all the authorities 
granted by the constitution to the Constitutional Court, as outlined in Article 
24C paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, are from a constitutional source and 
constitutionally founded.4
According to Wasis Susetio, the presence of the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi—MK) in a new democracy, as an institution 
needed to strengthen and protect the human right in a transitional period, 
requires a careful and intelligent approach to avoid confrontations which are 
highly detrimental to the strengthening of its existence. 5 
3  Ibid.
4  Ibid.
5  Wasis Susetio, “Guarding Constitution of Indonesia through the Court”, [http://www.ialsnet.org/meetings/constit/papers/
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MK must consider the opposition voiced by politicians and other state 
administrators who do not accept MK’ s decisions so as not to relapse to the 
condition similar to the one prior to the reform era. Institutional strengthening 
by applying natural methods requires strategic approaches to certain cases, 
which are not only based on populist opinions. The progress made by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court in the last three years has been remarkable, 
yet also caused a concern for many people and politicians. Such condition 
must be addressed prudently by the judge of the Constitutional Court. 
Prudence is needed to avoid being trapped in compliments and to carry out 
the action plan to gain public opinion that is favorable for the achievement 
of a consolidated democracy through the existence of MK, which serves as 
the checks and balances mechanism in a sound state administration system.6
With the role held by the Constitutional Court, it is important to understand 
the extent to which independence it has. As mentioned by Decision 005/PUU-
IV/20067, in a democratic rule-of-law state, as outlined in Article 1 paragraph (3) 
of the 1945 Constitution that reads, ”Indonesia shall be a rule-of-law state,” the 
independence of courts and judges is an essential element of a rule-of-law state 
or rechtsstaat. Due to the importance of such principle, the conception of the 
division of power among the executive, legislative, and judicative institutions and 
the conception of judicial independence are perceived as fundamental notions 
and determined as one of the main elements of the constitution and serve as 
the spirit of the law itself.8 
Even before the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, in which the 
principle of division of power was not adopted, the principle of the division and 
independence of judicial authorities had already confirmed, and it was reflected 
in Article 24 and its Elucidation. Now, after the first to fourth amendments to 
the 1945 Constitution, in which the branches of power of the state are divided 
based on the principle of checks and balances, mainly in the relation between 
the legislative and executive institutions, the division of judicative power from 
the influence of other branches of authority is more emphasized.9
SusetioWasis%28Indonesia%29.pdf].
6  Ibid.
7  Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006 was read out in a Plennary Session of the Constitutional Court open for public on this day Wednesday, 
August 23, 2006, by Prof. Dr. Jimly  Asshiddiqie, S.H., as the Chairperson acting also as a Member, H. Achmad Roestandi, S.H., 
Prof. H. A. Mukthie Fadjar, S.H. M.S., I Dewa Gede Palguna, S.H., M.H., Prof. H. A. S. Natabaya, S.H., LL.M., Dr. Harjono, S.H., 
M.C.L., Maruarar Siahaan, S.H., and Soedarsono, S.H. This decision is very crucial to explain about Independence of Courts and 
Judges issues in general.
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid.
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Related to that, Yustina Trihoni Nalesti Dewi, et.al. wrote, constitutional 
reform becomes a driving force strengthening the independence of judicial 
power. The amendment to Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution surely has made 
Indonesian Judicial Authority gains legal legitimacy to run the full freedom that 
focuses on the independence of judges who are not influenced by other powers 
out of the structure of judicial power.10
B. Research Method
 This paper intends to study the Constitutional Court of Indonesia as one 
of the state institutions conducting the independent judicial power to perform 
the judiciary to enforce law and justice to find out whether the Constitutional 
Court in exercising its constitutional authority can be independent. Also, this 
paper will examine not just institutional but also judges to understand current 
issues related to the role of ethics and conduct of judges.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Independence of Constitutional Court 
In the reform era, Indonesia has taken comprehensive reform measures by 
bringing the sovereignty back to the hand of the people. The peak of such efforts 
was the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which were made within four 
consecutive years, namely the First Amendment in 1999, the Second Amendment 
in 2000, the Third Amendment in 2001, and the Fourth Amendment in 2002. The 
objectives of the Amendments were to complement the core rules of living as a 
state, which caused the abuse of power in the past.11 These changes, according to 
Jimly Asshiddiqie, resulted in a blueprint of state administration system which is 
different from the previous one. Two of the fundamental principles adopted and 
reinforced in the new formulation of the 1945 Constitution are: (i) the principle 
of constitutional democracy, and (ii) the principle of the democratic rule of law 
or “democratische rechtsstaat.”12
10  Yustina Trihoni Nalesti Dewi, W. Riawan Tjandra, and Grant R. Niemann, “Independence of Judicial Power as a Foundation of Hu-
man Rights Judicial Function in Indonesia”, International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 2016, p. 242.
11  Moh. Mahfud MD, “The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Development of Democracy in Indonesia”, paper is presented in 
the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, Cape Town, January 23-4, 2009, p. 1.
12  Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Creating a Constitutional Court In a New Democracy”, paper presented in Australia, March 2009, p. 1. 
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The objective of the First Amendment to the 1945 Constitution is to restrict 
the authority of the President and to strengthen the position of the House of 
People’s Representatives as a legislative institution. The Second Amendment 
covers issues regarding state territory and regional governance, perfecting the 
first amendment in the matters about the strengthening of the position of the 
House of People’s Representative, and detailed provisions regarding Human Rights. 
The Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution covers the rules regarding the 
Principles for the foundation of state affairs, public institutions, relations among 
state institutions, and provisions relating to the General Election. The Fourth 
Amendment covers the provisions regarding state agencies and relationships 
among state institutions, the elimination of the Supreme Consultative Board, 
provisions regarding education and culture, provisions regarding economics and 
social welfare, and transitional rules as well as additional rules.13
Before the enactment of the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 
2001, the judicial power was dealt under two articles. Article 24(1) of the 1945 
Constitution states that: “The judiciary in Indonesia shall be exercised by the 
Supreme Court and such other judicial bodies as may be established by law.” 
Section (2) of then states that the composition and powers of the judicial bodies 
shall be, as provided for by law. Whereas, Article 25 of the 1945 Constitution 
states, “the requirements for the appointment and removal of judges shall be 
as provided for by law.”  In the  Elucidation of Article 24 and Article 25,  it is 
explicitly averred that the judicial power shall be independent, that is to say, free 
from the influence of the executive. As a result of the third amendment to the 
1945 Constitution, Article 24 (1) now reads as follows: “The judicial  power shall 
be independent in administering justice so as to uphold the law and equality.”14
In the opinion of Bagir Manan, the concept of independence of the judiciary 
is one of the cardinal principles of democracy.15 Almost all literature or the views 
of legal scholars state that the independent power of the court is a strengthening 
tool for the implementation of democracy, and upholding the rule of law. The 
13  Ibid.
14  Bagir Manan, “Independence of the Judiciary, Indonesian Experience”, [http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/2/10.pdf], p. 3.
15  Ibid.
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independent powers of the judiciary are undoubtedly the strongest pillar of 
democracy. However, that has not guaranteed the independence of judicial 
powers in any sense of the word.16  
According to the 1945 Constitution after amendment, judicial independence 
itself serves as a safeguard from the rule of law. Article 24 Constitutional Court 
Law states the judiciary shall be an independent authority to perform the bench 
to enforcing law and justice. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is one of the 
performers of the independent judicial power who plays a significant role in the 
enforcement of the constitution and the principle of the state based on the law 
by its authority and obligations as determined by the Constitution.17 
Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006 states, such principle is also universally adopted 
as reflected in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted 
by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, in Milan, on August 26 up to September 6, 1985, and 
ratified with the Resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN Number 40/32 
dated November 29, 1985 and Number 40/146 dated December 13, 1985, the 
articles 1, 4, 7, 14, and 15.18 
Therefore, judicial independence must be protected against all pressures, 
influences, and intervention of any party whosoever. Judicial independence is an 
essential prerequisite for the realization of the purpose of a rule-of-law state and 
serves as the guarantee for the enforcement of law and justice. This principle 
is inherent in and must be reflected in the examination and decision-making 
process in every case and is closely related to the independence of courts as 
honorable, dignified, trustable legal institution.19 
16  Ibid., p. 4.
17  Consideration of the Law Number 8 of the Year 2011 regarding the Amendment to the Law Number 24 of the Year 2003 regarding 
the Constitutional Court.
18  Which read among other things as follows: 1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined 
in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the 
independence of the judiciary; 4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor 
shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation 
or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law; 7. It is the duty of 
each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions; 14. The assignment 
of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. 15.  The judiciary shall 
be bound by professional secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of their 
duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to testify on such matters. Read Indonesian Constitutional 
Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, August 23, 2006.
19  Ibid.
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Related to that, Bagir Manan argues, the government system and organs, 
are not the only factors that would influence the independence of the judiciary, 
it is very much influenced by the social and cultural factors also. The culture 
of permissiveness or tolerance on the breach of law and social system are very 
significant in effect on the independence of judicial powers. Therefore, in the 
efforts to uphold the independent powers of the judiciary,  besides managing 
a  democratic government,  as based on law, it is also crucial to maintain a 
social life and promote a culture of law obedience, and the respect for judges 
and judicial powers.20  
The Constitutional Court shall be domiciled in the Capital City of the State 
of the Republic of Indonesia. According to Article 7 Constitutional Court Law, 
an Office of the Registrar and Secretariat General shall be established by the 
Constitutional Court to assist in the execution of the tasks and authorities of 
the Constitutional Court. 
The Office of the Registrar is a functional office which exercises judiciary 
technical, administrative functions of the Constitutional Court. The judiciary 
technical, administrative tasks comprise the coordination of judiciary technical 
implementation at the Constitutional Court; development and implementation 
of case administration; development of professional services for bench activities 
at the Constitutional Court; and the execution of other tasks assigned by the 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court by its field of works. 
The Secretariat General shall exercise technical, administrative tasks of 
the Constitutional Court. The technical administrative tasks comprise: the 
coordination of administrative executions in the environment of the Secretariat 
General and the Office of the Registrar; the formulation of professional 
administrative support plan and program; the conduct of cooperation with the 
society and inter-institutional relations; the rendering of facility support for 
court hearing activities; and the execution of other tasks assigned by the Chief 
Justice of the Constitutional Court in accordance with its field of jobs.21
20  Bagir Manan, Op.Cit., p. 4.
21  Further provisions regarding the structure of organization, function, duties, and authorities of the Office of the Registrar and 
of the Secretariat General of the Constitutional Court shall be regulated by a Regulation of the President at the proposal of the 
Constitutional Court.
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According to Constitutional Court Law, the Constitutional Court shall have 
the responsibility to regulate its organization, its personnel, its administration, 
and its finances by the principle of good and clean governance. The budget of the 
Constitutional Court charged to a separate budget in the State Budget of Income 
and Expenditure. However, the Constitutional Court shall announce periodical 
reports to the society transparently regarding petitions registered, examined, 
and judged on and management of the finances and other administrative tasks. 
The society also shall have access for acquiring judgments of the Constitutional 
Court.22 
The Constitutional Court has the authority to adjudicate at the first and 
final instance, whose decision shall be final. According to Elucidation of Article 
10 Constitutional Court Law, a decision of the Constitutional Court shall be 
final, namely that a ruling of the Constitutional Court shall immediately obtain 
permanent legal force as of its pronouncement and no legal efforts can be made. 
The final character of a decision of the Constitutional Court also comprises legal 
binding force (final and compulsory).
A ruling of the Constitutional Court shall be signed by the judge who 
examined, adjudicated, and decided the case, and the Registrar. A decision of 
the Constitutional Court shall obtain permanent legal force as of its complete 
pronouncement in a plenary session open to the public. The legal consideration of 
the judgment shall contain the legal basis constituting the basis of the decision. 
In the interest of the execution of authorities, the Constitutional Court has 
the power to summon a state official, government official, or a member of the 
society to provide information.
Up to the end of 2016, the Court has registered 2.319 cases. From all the 
cases, 1.993 cases have decided with results: 352 cases granted (kabul), 1.052 
cases rejected (ditolak), 667 cases dismissed (tidak diterima), 135 cases withdrawn 
(tarik kembali), and 16 cases failed (gugur).23 
22  Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono, “Kemerdekaan Kekuasaan Kehakiman”, [https://www.academia.edu/3412699/Kemerdekaan_Kekua-
saan_Kehakiman].
23  Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Harmoni Sosial dan Budaya Demokrasi yang Berkeadilan”, Laporan Tahunan mahkamah 
Konstitusi 2016, Kepaniteraan dan Sekretariat Jenderal MKRI, Jakarta, 2017, p. 9.
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Source: Annual Report Indonesian Constitutional Court 2016.
According to Fritz Edward Siregar, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court has 
functioned well as a protector of constitutional rights and defender of the 1945 
Constitution. However, the National Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat) and the Executive (President) are showing signs of wanting to restrain 
the influence of the Court. In 2011, the government amended the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court Act to reduce the authority of the Court.24 
As Bagir Manan stated that the constitutional guarantee, legal rules or law, 
in general, do not guarantee the reality of independence of judicial authorities. 
The independence of judicial powers mostly depends on external factors.25 Article 
45A prohibited the Court from issuing decisions was not sought by applicants 
(ultra petita). Article 57(2a) prevented the Court’s from making decisions that 
override legislated provisions that comply with the 1945 Constitution. By citing 
Article 45 of the South Korean Constitutional Court and the ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Marbury vs. Madison, the Court struck back by declaring 
24  Fritz Siregar, “Indonesian Constitutional Politics”, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 20, 2013, available at: [http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2013/10/indonesian-constitutional-politics]. Read more Decision Number 48/PUU-IX/2011 and Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
25  Bagir Manan, Op.Cit, p. 4.
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most of the articles in the 2011 amendment, including Article 45A and Article 
57(2a), constitutionally invalid.26
Article 45A states, “a judgment of the Constitutional Court shall not 
contain a verdict not petitioned by the petitioner or exceeding the petition 
of the petitioner, save to certain matters related to the subject matter of the 
petition.” Article 57 (2a) states, “a judgment of the Constitutional Court shall 
not contain a. A verdict other than as referred to in section (1) and section (2); 
b. A ruling to the lawmakers; and c. A norm formulation instead of the rule of 
law declared to be contrary to the Constitution of the State of the Republic of 
Indonesia of the Year 1945.” As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 2011, these articles 
has no longer legal binding force by a judgment of the Constitutional Court 
Number 48/ PUU-IX/2011. 
Since then, the Court have received many cases related to its authority and 
institution. Many articles of Constitutional Court Law have declared to have 
no legal binding force by Decision Number 48/PUU-IX/2011, Decision Number 
49/PUU-IX/2011 dated 18 October 2011, Decision Number 34/PUU-X/2012 dated 
25 September 2012, and Decision Number 7/PUU-XI/2013 dated 28 March 2013.
No. Constitutional Court Law Note
1. Article 4 (4f): “The election of the Chief 
Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court shall be conducted in 
1 (one) meeting for election.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
2. Article 4 (4g): “A candidate having obtained 
the majority vote in the election as referred 
to in section (4f) shall be designated as the 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
26   Fritz Siregar, “Indonesian Constitutional Politics”, Op.Cit.
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3. Article 4 (4h): “A candidate having obtained 
the second majority vote in the election 
as referred to in section (4f ) shall be 
designated as the Deputy Chief Justice of 
the Constitutional Court.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
4. Article 7A (1): “The Office of the Registrar 
as referred to in Article 7 is a functional 
office which exercises judiciary technical 
administrative tasks of the Constitutional 
Court.”
As of Tuesday, 25 September 
2012, this section has the legal 
binding force to the extent it 
is accompanied by the phrase 
“with the retirement age of 
62 (sixty-two) years for a 
Registrar, a Junior Registrar, 
and a Substitute Registrar” by a 
Judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 34/PUU-X/2012.
5. Explanation Article 10 (1): “A judgment 
of the Constitutional Court shall be 
final, namely that a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court shall immediately 
obtain permanent legal force as of its 
pronouncement and no legal efforts can be 
made. The final character of a judgment of 
the Constitutional Court in this Law also 
comprises legal binding force (final and 
binding).”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this explanation of article 
has no longer legal binding 
force by a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court Number 
49/PUU-IX/2011.
6. Explanation Article 10 (2): “Referred to 
as “opinion of the DPR” is an opinion 
of the DPR regarding an allegation of 
violation by the President and/or the Vice 
President resolved in a General Resolution 
in accordance with the laws regarding the 
People’s Consultative Assembly, the People’s 
Representative Council, the Regional 
Representative Council and the Regional 
People’s Representative Council, and the 
Regulation of the People’s Representative 
Council regarding the Code of Conduct.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this explanation of article 
has no longer legal binding 
force by a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court Number 
49/PUU-IX/2011.
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7. Article 15 (2) d: “In order to be eligible 
for appointment as a constitutional court 
justice, besides having to comply with the 
conditions as referred to in section (1), a 
candidate constitutional court justice shall 
comply with the conditions: 
d. he/she shall be of the age of at least 
47 (forty
-seven) years and at the highest of 65 
(sixty-five) years when appointed.”
As of Thursday, dated 28 March 
2013, this provision (letter d) 
has no longer legal binding 
force to the extent it does not 
mean “having the age of at least 
47 (forty-seven) years and at 
the highest of 65 (sixty-five) 
years at the first appointment” 
by virtue of a Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court Number 
7/PUU-XI/2013.
8. Article 15 (2) h: “In order to be eligible 
for appointment as a constitutional court 
justice, besides having to comply with the 
conditions as referred to in section (1), a 
candidate constitutional court justice shall 
comply with the conditions: 
h. He/she shall have work experience in 
the field
of law of at least 15 (fifteen) years and/
or have
been a state official.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this provision (letter h.) 
to the
the extent of the phrase “and/or 
has been a state official,” has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
9. Article 26 (5): “A replacing constitutional 
court justice as referred to in section (2) 
shall continue the remaining term of office 
of the constitutional court justice he/she 
replaces.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
10. Article 27A (2) c: “In order to uphold 
the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of 
Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices 
as referred to in section (1), the Assembly 
of Honor of the Constitutional Court shall 
be established with a
membership consisting of:
c. 1 (one) person from the DPR.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this provision (letter c.) 
has no
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court
Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
Independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in Norms and Practices
Constitutional Review, May 2017, Volume 3, Number 184
11. Article 27A (2) d: “In order to uphold 
the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of 
Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices 
as referred to in section (1), the Assembly 
of Honor of the Constitutional Court shall 
be established with a
membership consisting of:
d. 1 (one) person from the government 
who organizes government affairs in the 
field of law.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this provision (letter d.) 
has no
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
12. Article 27A (2) e: “In order to uphold 
the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of 
Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices 
as referred to in section (1), the Assembly 
of Honor of the Constitutional Court shall 
be established with a
membership consisting of:
e. 1 (one) supreme court justice.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this provision (letter e.) 
has no longer legal binding 
force by a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court
Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
13. Article 27A (3): “In the execution of its 
tasks, the Assembly of Honor of the 
Constitutional Court shall be guided by 
a. the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of 
Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices; 
b. the order of procedure for sessions of 
the Assembly of Honor the Constitutional 
Court; and c. the norms and the statutory 
rules and regulations.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
14. Article 27A (4): “The order of procedure 
of sessions of the Assembly of Honor the 
Constitutional Court as referred to in 
section (3) letter b contains the mechanism 
for the enforcement of the Ethical Code and 
the Guidelines of Conduct for Constitutional 
Court Justices and type of sanctions.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
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15. Article 27A (5): “The sanctions as referred 
to in section (4) may be in the form of 
a. a written reprimand; b. a temporary 
suspension; or c. discharge.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
16. Article 27A (6): “The membership of the 
Assembly of Honor the Constitutional 
Court stemming from the constitutional 
court justices as referred to in section 
(2) letter a shall be stipulated by the 
Constitutional Court.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011,  this section has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
17. Art ic le 45A:  “A judgment  of  the 
Constitutional Court shall not contain a 
verdict not petitioned by the petitioner or 
exceeding the petition of the petitioner, save 
to certain matters related to the subject 
matter of the petition.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this article has no longer 
legal  binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 48/PUU-IX/2011.
18. Article 50A: “The Constitutional Court in 
its review of a law against the Constitution 
of the State of the Republic of Indonesia of 
the Year 1945 shall not utilize other laws 
for its legal consideration.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this article has no longer 
legal  binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
19. Article 57 (2a): “A judgment of the 
Constitutional Court shall not contain: 
a. a verdict other than as referred to in 
section (1) and section (2); b. A ruling to 
the lawmakers; and c. a norm formulation 
in lieu of a norm of the law declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of the State of 
the Republic of Indonesia of the Year 1945.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this article has no longer 
legal  binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 48/PUU-IX/2011.
20. Article 59 (2): “If an amendment is required 
to a law which has been reviewed, the DPR 
or the President shall forthwith follow-up 
the judgment of the Constitutional Court 
as referred to in section (1) in accordance 
with the statutory rules and regulations.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this section has no longer 
legal binding force by a decision 
of the Constitutional Court 
Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
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21. Article 87: “By the time this Law enters 
into force: a. the constitutional court justice 
serving to date as Chief Justice or Deputy 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
shall remain serving as Chief Justice or 
Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court up to the expiry of his/her term of 
office by virtue of the provisions of the 
Law Number 24 of the Year 2003 regarding 
the Constitutional Court; and b. The 
constitutional court justices serving to date 
shall remain serving up to his/her discharge 
by the provisions of the Law Number 24 of 
the Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional 
Court.”
As of Tuesday, dated 18 October 
2011, this article has no longer 
legal  binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
22. Law Number 4 of the Year 2014 regarding 
Government Regulations in Lieu Number 
1 of the Year 2013 regarding Second 
Amendment of Law Number 24  of the 
Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional 
Court to Become Law.
As of  Thursday, dated 13 
February 2014, this Law has no 
longer legal binding force by a 
judgment of the Constitutional 
Court Number 1 -2/PUU-
XII/2014.
At the climax, on Thursday, 13 February 2014, Law Number 4 of the Year 
2014 regarding Government Regulations in Lieu Number 1 of the Year 2013 
regarding Second Amendment of Law Number 24 of the Year 2003 regarding 
the Constitutional Court to Become Law has no longer legal binding force by 
a judgment of the Constitutional Court Number 1-2/PUU-XII/2014. The Court 
has been strengthening independence by using its decision.
B. Independence of Constitutional Judges
There are a  number or international legal instruments that enshrine the 
importance of judicial independence. These include: Article 10 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 the International Covenant on Civil And 
Political Rights (ICCPR), paragraph 27 the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action 1993, the International Bar Association Code of Minimum  Standards of 
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Judicial Independence, New Delhi 1982, and the Universal   Declaration of the 
Independence of Justice, Montreal 1983.27   
According to Preamble of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes as fundamental principle 
that everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of rights and obligations 
and any criminal charge. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
also guarantees that all persons shall be equal before the courts, and that in the 
determination of any criminal charge or rights and obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing 
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by statute.28
The other fundamental principles and rights are also recognized or reflected 
in regional human rights instruments, in domestic constitutional, statutory and 
common law, and in constitutional conventions and traditions. The importance 
of a competent, independent and impartial judiciary to the protection of human 
rights is given emphasis by the fact that the implementation of all the other rights 
ultimately depends upon the proper administration of justice. The competent, 
independent and impartial judiciary is likewise essential if the courts are to 
fulfill their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law.29
Value 1, Independence Principle the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 
(2002), states, “Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and 
a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall, therefore, uphold and 
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.”30 
Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006 also states that the independence of judges and 
courts is materialized in the independence of judiciary, whether individually 
or as an institution, from various influences outside themselves in the form of 
persuasion, pressure, coercion, threat, or retribution due to particular political 
or economic interests of the government of the ruling political power or groups, 
27  Ibid., p. 3.
28  The Bangalore Draft Code of Judicial Conduct 2001 adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised 
at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002. [http://www.unodc.
org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf]. 
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid.
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with compensation or reward in the form of position, economic benefits, or 
other forms.31
Considering whereas the independence of judges is closely related to the 
impartiality of judges both in examination and decision-making process. A 
dependent judge cannot be expected to act neutral or impartially in performing 
his/her duties. Likewise, a judicial institution dependent to other organs in 
certain fields and unable to independently manage itself could also result in 
non-neutral attitude in performing its duties. Such independence also has 
different aspects. Functional Independence contains a prohibition for other 
branches of power to intervene with judges in performing their judicial duties. 
However, such independence must not be interpreted as absolute, because 
it is limited by law and justice. The aforementioned independence is also 
to be interpreted that judges are free to pass their verdicts in accordance 
with their beliefs based on legal interpretation, although verdicts based on 
such interpretation and belief may be contradictory to those having political 
and administrative powers. If the verdicts are not in line with the wish of 
the ruling party, it cannot be used as an excuse to affect retribution against 
judges, whether personally or against the authority of judicial institutions [“.…
when a decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those with political power, 
can not affect retribution on the judges personally or on the power of the 
court” (Theodore L. Becker in Herman Schwartz, Struggle for Constitutional 
Justice, 2003 page 261)];32
Such independence relates to the examination and decision-making process 
in cases faced by judges, to obtain verdicts that are free from pressure, influence, 
whether physical or psychical in nature, and corruption due to Corruption, 
Collusion, Nepotism, therefore, actually, such independence is not the privilege 
of judges, but an indispensable right or inherent right of justices in the context 
of ensuring the fulfillment of the human right of citizens to obtain fair trial. 
Therefore, mutually, judges are required to act independently and impartially to 
meet the human rights of justice seekers (justitiabelen). It automatically includes 
the right of magistrates to be free from pressures, influences, and threats.33 
Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006 in the argument that independence must be 
interpreted within limits determined by law and in the context of fair enforcement 
of the law, as mentioned above. Independence is also in line with accountability 
31  Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, August 23, 2006.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid.
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realized through supervision. However, the sensitivity level of judges is extremely 
high because two opposite parties are defending the interests of the conflicting 
parties. Therefore, the independence of judiciary also serves as, in addition to 
inherent right, a prerequisite for the impartial act of magistrates in performing 
judicial duties.34 
The form of accountability demanded from judges requiring a format that 
can accommodate such sensitivity. Carelessness both in the formulation of 
responsibility mechanism in the kind of supervision and the implementation 
thereof may result in negative impacts to the existing judicial process. The 
necessary trust to require compliance with and acceptance to the verdicts made 
by judges is currently in a critical condition. However, the remaining low level of 
trust must be maintained to prevent it from complete lost. Therefore, the intention 
to keep the honor, dignity, and attitude of judges is, in fact, counterproductive 
and will eventually result in legal chaos.35
According to Article 21 Constitutional Court Law, before taking office, the 
Constitutional Court Justices shall swear an oath or a promise by their respective 
religions. The sworn oath and promise are conducted in front of the President. 
The pledge or promise shall be as follows:
The Oath of a Constitutional Court Justice
“In the name of Allah I swear that I will do my best in fulfilling all obligations 
as a Constitutional Court Justice, and I will be as good and fair as possible, 
abide by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and apply 
all legislations and laws as strict as possible in accordance with the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and serve the country and the 
nation.”
The Promise of a Constitutional Court Justice
“I solemnly promise that I will do my best in fulfilling my obligations as a 
Constitutional Court Justice, and I will be, and I will be as good and fair 
as possible, abide by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 
and apply all legislations and laws as strict as possible in accordance with 
the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and serve the country 
and the nation.” 36
34  Ibid.
35  Ibid.
36  [http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilMK&id=7&menu=2]. 
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The Constitutional Court has nine constitutional court justice members who 
shall be designated by a Decree of the President. The issuance of a Decree of 
the President in this provision is of an administrative character. The structure 
of the Constitutional Court consists of one chief justice being concurrently a 
member, one deputy chief justice being concurrently a member, and 7 (seven) 
constitutional court justice members. A constitutional court judge is a state official. 
The constitutional court judges shall be proposed respectively 3 (three) people 
by the Supreme Court, 3 (three) people by the DPR, and 3 (three) people by the 
President. The candidacy of the constitutional court justices shall be executed 
transparently and participatory. A candidate constitutional court justice shall be 
published in print as well as electronic mass media so that the society can give 
input regarding the respective candidate justice.
The provisions relating to the procedures for the selection, election, and 
submission of the constitutional court judges shall be regulated by the individual 
authorized institutions. The election of the Constitutional Court judges shall 
be executed objectively and accountable. The term of office of a constitutional 
court justice is five years, and he/she can be re-elected only for one subsequent 
term of office.
Constitutional Court judge shall comply with the following conditions: a. He/
she shall have integrity and impeccable personality; b. He/she shall be just; and c. 
He/she shall be a statesman/stateswoman having command over the constitution 
and constitutionalism. To be eligible for appointment as a constitutional court 
justice, besides having to comply with that conditions, a candidate constitutional 
court judge shall comply with the conditions: 
a. he/she shall be an Indonesian citizen;
b. he/she shall hold a doctor’s and a master’s degree with a basis of an 
undergraduate’s background of higher education in law;
c. he/she shall have faith in God the One Only and be of noble character;
d. he/she shall be of the age of at least 47 (forty-seven) years and at the 
highest of 65 (sixty-five) years at the first appointment;
e. he/she shall be physically and mentally capable of performing his/her 
duties and obligations;
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f. he/she shall have never been sentenced to criminal imprisonment by a 
court judgment which has obtained permanent legal force;
g. he/she is not being declared bankrupt by virtue of a court judgment; 
and
h. he/she shall have work experience in the field of law of at least 15 
(fifteen) years.37
Constitutional Court justice will be discharged honorably due to a. His/her 
demise; b. His/her resignation on own accord submitted to the Chief Justice 
of the Constitutional Court; c. He/she reaches the age of 70 (seventy) years; 
d. Expiry of his/her term of office; e. Physical or mental disease for 3 (three) 
consecutive months so that he/she cannot perform his/her tasks as substantiated 
by a medical statement of a physician. 
Constitutional Court justice is discharged dishonorably if a. He/she is 
convicted to criminal imprisonment by a court judgment having obtained 
permanent legal force due to committing a criminal act threatened with criminal 
imprisonment; b. He/she commits disgraceful acts; c. He/she has been absent 
from sessions being his/her duties and obligations for 5 (five) consecutive times 
without valid reasons; d. He/she has violated his/her oath or pledge of office; 
e. he/she deliberately obstructs the Constitutional Court to render a judgment 
within a period as referred to in Article 7B Section (4) of the 1945 Constitution; 
f. he/she has violated the prohibition to hold concurrent offices as referred to 
in Article 17; g. He/she no longer meets the qualifications as a constitutional 
court justice; and h. He/she has violated the Ethical Code and the Guidelines 
for Conduct of a Constitutional Justice.
The protocol status and the financial entitlements of the Chief Justice, the 
Deputy Chief Justice, and the members of the Constitutional Court shall be 
subject to the provisions of the statutory rules and regulations for state officials. 
The state shall grant security guaranty for constitutional court justices in the 
exercise of their duties and responsibilities as executors of the judicial power. 
A constitutional court judge is prohibited from holding office as a concurrently 
37  These requirement according to Constitutional Court Law, Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 7/PUU-XI/2013 and Deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.
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a. Another state official; b. A member of a political party; c. A businessperson; 
d. An advocate; e. A civil servant.
A constitutional court justice can only be subjected to police acts by order 
of the Attorney General after having obtained the approval in writing of the 
President, save in matters of a. Being caught red-handed while committing a 
criminal act; or b. by the adequate initial evidence he/she is alleged to have 
committed a criminal offense which is subject to capital punishment, a criminal 
offense against the security of the state, or a particular criminal act. 
Unfortunately, on Wednesday, October 2, 2013, the Corruption Eradication 
Commission arrested Akil Mochtar, the Chief Justice of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court, for alleged bribery.38 On Thursday, January 27, 2017, Justice 
Patrialis allegedly accepted gratification related to the Judicial Review of Law 
(UU) No. 41/2014 on Animal Health and Husbandry also by the Corruption 
Eradication Commission.39
C. The Ethical Code and the Guidelines for Conduct of a Constitutional 
Justice
Article 27A Constitutional Law states the Constitutional Court shall draw up 
the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of Conduct for Constitutional Court Justices 
containing norms to be complied with by every constitutional court judge in the 
performance of their duties to safeguard the integrity and impeccable personality, 
being just, and statesmanship.40 
The Constitutional Court already have a Code of Constitutional Judicial Ethics 
and Conduct, which is mainly based on The Bangalore Principles of Conduct of 
2002 and added with the Indonesian cultural values. The code of Constitutional 
Judicial ethics and conduct has been declared with the name of Sapta Karsa 
Hutama on October 17, 2005, and revised on December 1, 2006. 
According to Decision 005/PUU-IV/2006, the aforementioned guidelines 
on judicial conduct are intended to regulate the allowed, restricted, mandatory, 
38  Stefanus Hendrianto, The Indonesian Constitutional Court at a Tipping Point, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, October 3, 2013, available at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/10/the-indonesian-constitutional-court-at-a-tipping-point
39  [https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/01/27/055840547/Patrialis-Akbar-Corruption-Case-Brings-Disaster-for-Public].
40  This norms states on the Law Number 8 of the Year 2011 regarding the Amendment to the Law Number 24 of the year 2003 
regarding the Constitutional Court.
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and suggested or non-suggested judicial conduct, both inside or outside the 
office, in order to form justice as judicial authorities officials (ambtsdrager van 
rechtelijkemacht) having ideal and fair integrity and personality so as to become 
the final fort in law and fairness enforcement efforts. The aforementioned 
guidelines of conduct are the elaboration of provisions of the code of ethics 
that are universally and generally applicable and accepted as the moral values 
and norms followed by people or a group of individuals in regulating their 
conduct, with the purpose of identifying what are good and what are bad in 
their behaviour among their fellows in their group.41 
The professional code of ethics, as seen in the Code of Constitutional Judicial 
Ethics and Conduct as well as Guidelines for Indonesian Judicial Conduct 
applicable in the Supreme Court, contains a series of basic principles and 
the morality values that must be upheld by justice, inside and outside 
their office. The aforementioned principles and values are further detailed 
in the form of judicial conduct that is deemed in accordance with the 
aforementioned principles or values. For example, the value of fair conduct 
is translated as a principle in the form of description of what are deemed 
as fair, and it is subsequently detailed how the foregoing is described in 
Judicial conduct while performing judicial duties. Similarly, when integrity 
value or principle is adopted as part of the professional code of ethics, the 
aforementioned integrity principle has been given a limit, that “constitutes 
mental attitude reflecting the integrity and balance of personality of any judge 
as a person and as a state official in performing his respective duties. The 
integrity of personality includes honesty, loyalty, and sincerity in performing 
his professional duties, equipped with the mental strength to set aside and 
reject all persuasions and temptation on position, asset, popularity or other 
inducements. Personality balance includes mental and physical balance, and 
spiritual intellectual, emotional intellectual, and intellectual balance in his 
performance of duties.” From the implementation of the aforementioned 
principle, it can be known for example that the judge guarantees that his 
conduct is not disgraceful from the appropriate observation perspective or 
his attitude and conduct must strengthen people’s trust on judicial image 
and authority. Fairness is not only performed but must also be seen as 
performed.42
In order to safeguard and uphold integrity and  impeccable personality, justice, 
and statesmanship, a constitutional court judge shall comply with statutory rules 
41  Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006, August 23, 2006.
42  Ibid.
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and regulations, attend sessions, implement the procedural law as it should be, 
follow the Ethical Code and the Guidelines of Conduct for Constitutional Court 
Justices, treat litigants justly, indiscriminative, and  impartially; and render 
judgments in an objective manner by virtue of facts and law which can be 
accounted for. A constitutional court justice is prohibited: to violate his/her oath/
pledge of office, to receive a gift or promise from the litigants, either directly or 
indirectly; and to give out court opinions or statements on cases being handled 
by him/her before judgment.
As wrote by Stefanus Hendrianto, In 2009, the Court’s Council of Ethics 
found that Justice Arsyad’s family had held meetings with Arsyad’s law clerk to 
discuss the cases. The Council concluded that Arsyad violated the judiciary code 
of ethics because he failed to stop his family members from making a deal with 
parties involved in cases being handled by the Court. Arsyad maintained that 
he did not commit any crime and he denied that his daughter had introduced 
the candidate to him. Nevertheless, Arsyad tendered his resignation.43
On March 2016, the Council of Ethics recommended that Chief Justice Arief 
Hidayat is given a special warning. The Ethics Council ruled that the Chief 
Justice acted with a lack of prudence in issuing the letter of recommendation 
because it could create negative perceptions. Nevertheless, it did not find any 
gross violations of ethics and broadly accepted Chief Justice Hidayat’s version 
of events.44 
III. CONCLUSION
The independence of the Indonesian Constitutional Court supported by 
the 1945 Constitution after the amendments from 1999 until 2002, and further 
stipulated in Law. However, it can be said that this institution has ups and downs 
of public trust due to corruption cases conducted by constitutional justices. Also, 
in several political instances showed efforts of political institutions to limit the 
43  Stefanus Hendrianto, The Indonesian Constitutional Court at a Tipping Point, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, October 3, 2013, available at: 
[http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/10/the-indonesian-constitutional-court-at-a-tipping-point].
44  Read more Stefanus Hendrianto, The “Ethics” of the Indonesian Constitutional Court: How Low Can It Go?, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 
May 25, 2016, at: [http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/05/the-ethics-of-the-indonesian-constitutional-court-how-low-can-it-go/].
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authority of the Constitutional Court. In its experiences, the Constitutional Court 
succeeded in convincing the parties through its decisions and strengthening 
institutional independence against the influence that tried to destabilize its 
institutions. 
The Council of Ethics of Constitutional Judges to maintain the values and 
behavior of judges is also continuously work and efficient enough in overseeing 
the ethics and conduct of judges. The decision of the Ethics Council may also 
be accepted as a proportional decision. However, there are other issues that 
need to be studied more deeply, such as the political links between the tenure 
of the judge and the appointment of judges by the institution authorized by it, 
and the extent to which the independence of the Constitutional Court can be 
influenced by institutional leadership factors. 
I agree with Fritz Edward Siregar that wrote, the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia used the limited window that it had to drive political change and 
retain its legitimacy.45 “Even though the Court was attacked, it continued to live 
with no consequences and gained even more public support. The Court has been 
bold enough to take this momentum and become one of the most respected 
and trustworthy institutions in Indonesia”.46 
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